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Abstract
We develop a theoretical and empirical framework for the connections be-
tween global nancial and sovereign CDS markets. The transmission of
shocks is shown to a¤ect the systemic default probability of the interna-
tional network. The network is found to be "robust but fragile", meaning
that a shock can result in the propagation of crises. Between 2003 and
2013, the probability of default in the network in the face of potentially
poor investment outcomes and/or sovereign bond haircuts changes sub-
stantially. The results suggest that it is the interconnectedness of the
nancial and sovereign debt markets that provides increased protection
against nancial fragility.
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1 Introduction
International connections between banks and sovereign debt markets are impor-
tant for nancial and economic stability. However, the complex nature of these
connections and the direction of inuence remains a matter of debate; see, for
example, discussions in Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) and Kallestrup et al (2016).1
Theoretical arguments can be made for poor macroeconomic policy weakening
the state of the economy and transferring stress to the banking sector. Alterna-
tively, an abrupt interruption of private credit growth may weaken the banking
market to the extent that it requires government support, in turn undermining
sovereign creditworthiness. A spiral of weakening banks and weakening sov-
ereign credit may result when banks have signicant holdings of sovereign debt.
These network e¤ects can spill over to the real economy; see Carvahalo (2010),
Acemoglu et al (2012), Anufriev and Panchenko (2015).
This paper develops a theoretical and empirical framework for analyzing the
network of connections between nancial institutions and sovereign debt, focus-
ing on evidence of changes in the network structure during periods of market
stress. The framework provides a mechanism by which robust-but-fragilenet-
works may emerge in the face of an unexpected shock to the system through
poor investments and/or poor government policies.
Our theoretical framework consists of two sectors: nancial institutions
(banks) and sovereigns. Banks are engaged in capital lending with one an-
other without a requirement to borrow all available funds. Each bank has an
opportunity to invest in the real economy with an uncertain return. Financial
institutions that choose to retain (some) funds in the sovereign debt market face
the risk of a haircut. In this case, both sectors experience a potential underin-
vestment problem caused by an external shock. The volatility of this shock has
nonlinear e¤ects on the network, and illustrates how the default of a nancial
institution and/or sovereign can potentially increase the probability of other
1Other relevant literature includes Kalbaska and Gatowski (2012), Alter and Schuler
(2012), Ureche-Rangau and Burietz (2013), Bruyckere et al (2013).
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entities defaulting.
By generalizing the results of Acemoglu et al (2015), we show that the default
of a sovereign or nancial institution as a result of the unexpected shock leads
to multiple equilibria dened by a collection of mutually consistent payments
between entities. To analyze the continuum of equilibria, we show how to assess
the sensitivity of the counterparty to default. This quantity measures how
counterparty default inuences the ability of an entity to meet obligations.
Given the existence of multiple equilibria, systemic default probabilities oc-
cur in di¤erent scenarios related to normal or poor investment outcomes. In
particular, we consider the following scenarios: Good times, in which returns
in the real economy are good and there are no sovereign defaults, in which
case the network is relatively robust; Poor investment, in which returns in the
real economy are poor but there are no sovereign defaults; Poor government,
in which retuns in the real economy are good but government policy leads to
sovereign bond haircuts; and Stress conditions, in which both poor returns in
the real economy and sovereign haircuts stress the network2 . These scenarios
permit identication of the e¢ cient equilibrium as the state that minimizes the
aggregate loss of all creditors.
Empirically, we provide evidence on three specic hypotheses regarding the
changing nature of a global network comprising 67 nancial sector institutions
and 40 sovereigns via the CDS market over the period 2003 - 2013. Speci-
cally, our framework provides evidence for (i) changes in link strength between
nodes, consistent with existing tests of contagion; (ii) changes in the number
of connections between nodes, that is, the network may become more or less
dense, as evidenced in existing network literature; and (iii) changes in network
completeness weighted by the strength of linkages, combining information on
the existence of linkages and their relative importance. We test for potential
changes in the network from September 15, 2008, consistent with the global
nancial crisis initiated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and from April 1,
2010, consistent with the period of the Greek and subsequent sovereign debt
2The rst two cases are consistent with the original Acemoglu et al (2015) analysis.
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crises in Europe.
Our evidence supports a high degree of network completeness, consistent
with the major role played by common factors in Longsta¤ et al (2011). The
empirical framework is based on a network of edges assessed by Granger causal-
ity tests; see also Billio et al (2012) and Merton et al (2013). Drawing on Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009, 2014, 2016) and weighting the existence of linkages by their
strength, we show that nancial network completeness falls; see also Atil et al
(2016) and Fabozzi et al (2016). The number of links and the completeness
of the network incorporating nancial institutions and sovereigns may increase
across certain crises, as in Billio et al (2012), or fall, as in Caporin et al (2014).
Net declines in network completeness may, for example, represent the removal of
a large number of weaker linkages and their replacement with a small number of
stronger linkages, resulting in di¤erences in network topology between periods.
This is important because policymakers may wish to react quite di¤erently to
a larger, more loosely connected network than to a more concentrated strongly
connected one; see, for example, the literature on bank concentration during
crises, Beck et al (2006).
Our approach nests tests for contagion in a systemic risk assessment through
the removal and formation of new linkages during periods of nancial stress.
Contagion is dened as the formation of new linkages, such as new common-
alities between formerly unrelated assets, see Bekaert et al (2014) and Dungey
and Martin (2007), or the breakdown of linkages between counterparties (Gai
and Kapadia, 2010) and di¤erences in the transmission mechanisms for tail-
shocks, as in Boyson et al (2010) and Busetti and Harvey (2011). By using
the Granger causality framework, we are methodologically associated with the
contagion literature; see Longsta¤ (2010), Marais and Bates (2006) and Sander
and Kleimeier (2003).3
3Acemoglu et al (2015) use the term contagion to denote the transmission of shocks across
their networks based on the known lending relationships between banks. Their usage is more
consistent with spillovers, where spillovers are ex ante known linkages between nodes; con-
tagion is usually used to refer to transmission of shocks beyond that indicated by the usual
linkages. For an overview, see Dungey et al (2005).
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Evidence of changes in the network structure around the timing of the global
nancial crisis supports shifts in relationships between nancial institutions and
sovereign debt markets. One form of these shifts is consistent with both a global
ight from markets with heavily increased risk during the crisis notably source
markets from European sovereigns and US nancial institutions represented
by the breakdown of network linkages. The other form represents seeking new
markets, consistent with a shift in relative risk/return trade-o¤s globally no-
tably increased linkages with Africa represented by the formation of new links
in the network.
We calculate the expected number of defaults for the network in di¤erent
sample phases in four di¤erent scenarios (Good times, Poor investment, Poor
government and Stress) to illustrate the di¢ culties inherent in nancial regula-
tion. In the period prior to the Lehman Brothers collapse, the expected number
of defaults for all entities in the Poor government and Good times scenarios is
relatively low. In this case, even a large shock is expected to cause only a small
number of defaults. The combined network is more fragile in the Poor invest-
ment scenario. However, in crisis periods, the expected number of defaults in
the combined network is almost the same in the Poor government and Poor
investment scenarios, indicating feedback e¤ects between banks and sovereigns.
Default risk is highest in the second phase, equivalent to the global nancial
crisis period, when it is almost ve-fold that of the pre-crisis period. During
the period of the Greek and European sovereign debt crises, the third phase,
default risk returns to previous levels in the case of Poor government, while
under Stress conditions and Poor investment, the expected number of defaults
is lower than before. An immediate practical outcome of these results is to sup-
port the calls for regulators to recognize the need for non-zero risk weightings
on sovereign debt in bank capital assessment; see Hannoun (2011) and, for evi-
dence on the potential importance of the so-called zero risk practice, Korte and
Ste¤en (2015).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework
for modelling a network incorporating nancial institutions (banks), real econ-
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omy rms and sovereign debt. Section 3 explores the data set used for empirical
analysis. The econometric methodology for establishing edges is outlined in
Section 4, and Section 5 presents results for our sample of 107 entities (nancial
institutions and sovereigns). Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
Papers by Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Acemoglu et al (2015) propose a theoret-
ical framework for modeling networks between banks and simulate the transmis-
sion of shocks through banking networks. We extend the framework of Acemoglu
et al (2015) to consider that banking network connections are susceptible to po-
tential defaults on sovereign debt. Acemoglu et al (2015) specically include the
possibility that banks do not take full advantage of all possible borrowing op-
tions available within their bank counterparty network and instead hoard funds
as a form of cash reserve. In particular, they identify this component of a banks
portfolio decision as representing investment in sovereign debt, which provides
a standard riskless return, R, thus acting as cash in their model. Our extension
speaks strongly to outcomes for banking networks when the return on sovereign
debt is uncertain. Specically, we show that the results in Acemoglu et al (2015)
regarding the stability and fragility of banking networks transfer directly to the
extended network between sovereign debt markets and banking. This combined
network is highly interconnected, demonstrating a robust-yet-fragile structure,
Haldane (2009), which is at risk when exposed to a large enough single shock,
or su¢ ciently proximate contemporaneous small shocks.
2.1 The model of banks and sovereigns
Banks are in the business of lending for projects with uncertain returns. As
in Diamond (1982) banks cannot fund their lending activities from their own
balance sheets and need to engage in inter-bank relationships. This creates
networks of liabilities between banks, where the edges are determined by re-
payments required between pairs of nancial institutions. Banking networks
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become highly interconnected as banks can hold assets and liabilities with any
number of other banks in the network, as in Allen and Babus (2009).
Consider a risk-neutral bank, operating in a three-period time frame as in
Acemoglu et al (2015). Each bank has capital to lend and a pre-determined
individual credit limit with each other bank in the network (total available
loans to bank i from bank j may not match the corresponding gure available
to bank j from bank i). No bank is required to borrow the total credit available,
but they are all required to settle all interbank liabilities at each t = 1; 2.
Each bank has the opportunity in period t = 0 to pursue an investment
opportunity in the real economy, zi, with an uncertain return in period t = 1
but a certain, non-pledgable return at t = 2. If the bank needs to redeem its
investment at t = 1 the fraction of the loan it may recover is assumed to be
small.
Our extension concerns funds that banks choose not to invest. In Acemoglu
et al (2015) these funds, denoted ci; are considered equivalent to a sovereign
bond, bearing a certain return, R, with no risk. We extend the analysis to
consider not only the investment project having an uncertain payo¤ but also a
haircut risk to the sovereign bond. In this case, in period t = 1; the values of
returns zi and ci are inuenced by an external shock, ui, which is a random
variable drawn from a given distribution with mean zero and variance one, and
its standard deviation4 is i. The joint probability distribution p(u1; :::; un) for
n entities5 is assumed to be known.
Denition 1 Network G is the pair (N ,E), where N is a set of nodes repre-
senting entities (banks or sovereigns), and a set of edges E represents contracts
between two entities from lender to borrower.
After making investment decisions in the initial period, at time t = 1; the
4Shock ui contains uncertainty about sovereigns and nancial institutions and can be seen
as an aggregated shock. However, it is trivial to separately analyse disaggregated shocks.
Acemoglu et al (2015) and Glasserman and Young (2015) imply that shocks have a negative
impact on returns. In this paper, the shock ui; takes a value between -1 and 1, which permits
positive shocks.
5 In the following discussion, the term entity means bank (nancial institution) or sovereign.
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bank has to settle counterparty liabilities with other banks in the network, yj ,
and meet its unavoidable contractual obligations, such as wages, and required
payments to investment projects, vj . We assume that vj is senior to counter-
party payments. Resources available to make these repayments, j , consist of
the funds the bank placed in sovereign bond investments, cj , uncertain rst-
period returns on the investment project, zj ; and repayments from counterpar-
ties,
P
i 6=j xj;i.
Dene a default indicator dj , with dj = 1 if entity j defaults at time t = 1
and dj = 0 otherwise. If all entities are assumed to default, xj;i(dj) = 1,
8i; j. An entity j defaults if its assets, j ; at time t = 1 are smaller than total
liabilities lj = vj+yj . That is the entity will not be able to meet its rst-period
obligations in the case in which
j = cj + zj + juj +
X
i 6=j
xj;i < vj + yj : (1)
The default condition, dened in equation (1), is expressed as a function of
the stochastic shock, uj ; that impacts both sovereign and bank returns6 , which
permits us to rewrite (1) as
uj <
cj + zj +
P
i 6=j xj;i   vj   yj
 j = qj ; (2)
in which qj denes the threshold value for shock uj . If uj < qj , the shock causes
the default of entity j. In this case, sign and magnitude of shock uj impact
the default probability of entity j and its obligations, potentially increasing the
default probability of other entities. Moreover, the default probability also de-
pends on the volatility of shock j that nonlinearly a¤ects the network. It is
unlikely that an absolute threshold value can be established across multiple mar-
kets (for example, banking sectors of individual economies), as the variability
of shocks may vary across di¤erent networks.
Equation (2) can be used to express the default condition of n entities in
6This implication is di¤erent from Acemoglu et al (2015), who assume that cj is certain,
which means that risk arises entirely from the uncertainty a¤ecting zj . Note that uj can be
easily expressed as a combination of independent shocks a¤ecting the di¤erent entities.
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terms of the default indicators, dj ; as
dj = 1(qj   uj); (3)
in which 1 denotes the step function, which is equal to one if the argument is
positive and zero otherwise7 . A solution of the system (3) is represented by
vector bd = (d1; :::; dn).
Denition 2 An equilibrium is dened by a vector of default indicators, d =
(d1; :::; dn); that is a solution of equation (3).
In general, a solution of equation (3) can be represented by multiple equi-
libria, which have two sources. First, an interdependence of entity liabilities
might imply more than one vector bd. Second, there can be multiple values of
shocks uj that solve equation (3). While a typical approach in the literature8 is
to focus on the best-case equilibria, in which as few entities as possible default,
we show in the following section that a multiplicity of equilibria can be useful
for analyzing di¤erent scenarios of the changing international network.
As every counterparty can have only two states (default, dj = 1, or no
default, dj = 0). Denition 2 implies that qj for every entity j can take a nite
number of values, 2nj , where nj is the number of counterparties borrowing from
entity j. Given that shock uj is a random variable taking values on the interval
[ 1; 1], it is important to identify conditions under which the value of uj has an
impact on the default of entity j.
Proposition 1 Under the mapping ~qj = minfmaxfqj ; 1g; 1g the default is a
function of shock uj.
Proposition 1 implies that when  1 < qj < 1, shock uj a¤ects network G.
It unnecessary to constrain the values of qj ; however, this range is of interest
in default scenarios, a primary focus of this paper. When the values of qj lie
outside [ 1; 1]; the results become independent of shock uj .
7This notion is similar to Roukny, Battiston and Stiglitz (2016). An alternative formulation
of the default condition counts losses in dollars related to the insolvency of entities of the
network rather than the number of defaults (Glasserman and Yong, 2016), which is consistent
with the SRISK approach promoted by the NYU Stern Volatility Laboratory project.
8 see, e.g., Elliott et al. (2014)
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2.2 Multiple equilibria
The main task now is to identify how the network structure leads to unique or
multiple solutions of system (3). Following default condition (2), a collection
of mutually consistent payments between entities at t = 1 dene the network
structure, also dened by an entitys borrowing counterpartiesdefault state.
This setting implies that a shock to an entity might not only lead to that
entitys default, but might also initiate a cascade of creditor defaults, permitting
nancial contagion in the system.
Denition 3 A walk Pj1;jk is a sequence of entities (j1; :::; jk) such that the
pairs (j1; j2), (j2; j3),...,(jk 1; jk) 2 E are edges of the network. A walk is
closed if the rst and the last institution in the sequence are the same, and open
if they are di¤erent. The length of the walk Pj1;jk is given by the number of
edges, k; contained in it. A cycle Cn is a closed walk represented by n entities
and n  1 edges.
Following Denition 3, in a network of banks and sovereigns, a cycle is an
arrangement of contracts that can be represented by a circle in which an entity
j borrows from one neighbor and lends to another neighbor.
Denition 4 The sensitivity of entity j to the default of counterparty i is
scdj;i = ~qj(Hki=1)  ~qj(Hki=0);8i 6= j (4)
in which Hki=1 is the realization of defaults of k entities subject to di = 1.
Entity j may also fail if counterparties fail to pay their debts, providing
another source of multiple equilibria. Inability to pay is closely related to the
sensitivity of the counterparties of entity j, as dened in (4). In particular, the
sensitivity of counterparties to default measures how the inability of entity j to
meet its obligations inuences entity i, which implies that more fragile entities
have a higher sensitivity to default. The presence of cycles in the network
and dependencies between the liabilities of entities are important conditions for
generating multiple equilibria, as formalized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 2 Consider a network of n institutions with xdj =
P
i 6=j x
d
j;i, in
which xdj;i is the amount of money that institution j recovers from the default of
institution i. Suppose that xdj < 1, unavoidable contractual obligations vj > 0,
and the shock variance j > 0 is nite. Multiple equilibria exist if and only if
(a) a cycle Ck of contracts along k >= 2 institutions exists;
(b) for each entity in cycle Ck, the sensitivity to default scdj;i 6= 0.
Necessary condition (a) in proposition 2 relates the existence of multiple
equilibria to the network structure. In particular, the network contains at least
two entities with interdependent default conditions. Su¢ cient condition9 (b)
species how defaults inuence entities belonging to cycle Ck. If for a given
shock uj , the default condition of institution j does not change, regardless of
whether the borrowing counterparties of j default, there are no multiple equi-
libria for institution j. Formally, realizations Hkj are identical for j = 1 and
j = 0.
An important implication of proposition 2 is that nancial network equi-
libria are dened by the default indicators, dj , dependent on shock uj . In
fact, condition (b) implies there is a large shock, uj , triggering institutions
in cycle Ck. This nding motivates incorporating unexpected shocks into the
empirical framework, as proposed in the following section. Variance decomposi-
tions capture the impacts of shocks on the network, relating our methodological
framework to the approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2014). Proposition 2 also
suggests that an acyclical network, such as a tree, will have a unique equilibrium
for all possible realizations of shocks. Moreover, if the nodes of a network are
represented by only outgoing or incoming links, there is only one equilibrium.
In other words, if entities either only borrow from or only lend money to their
counterparties, a continuum of equilibria does not exist; networks need at least
one bivariate linkage to generate multiple equilibria in this framework.
9 If shock uj = 0 for all institutions, the su¢ cient condition (b) is similar to the unique
payment equilibrium condition of Acemoglu et al (2015), which is
P
j(zj + cj) 6= nv. This
condition restrict banks to default due to "coordination failures".
11
Denition 5 Given a distribution p(u), the expected number of defaults is rep-
resented by
Pn
i=1 scd
2
j;i=n.
As follows from Denition 5, the expected number of defaults in the network
is dened by sensitivity indicators scdj;i aggregated across all entities. This
measure depends not only on the size of the realized shocks, uj , but also on
the variance of shocks, j , and the network structure. Moreover, the expected
number of defaults measure is closely related to a variance decomposition. This
result motivates the proposed econometric framework, which will be discussed
in greater detail in the following sections.
2.3 Systemic default probability
Given the solution of system (3) and a joint probability density function of
shocks p(u), following Roukny et al (2016), a systemic default indicator dsys
can be dened as
dsys = 1fPj djng; (5)
in which threshold n denes how many entities initiate systemic default. If
n = n, systemic default is a situation in which all entities cannot meet their
obligations. If there is a unique equilibrium for the default state, d, the systemic
default probability can be dened as
P sys =
Z
dsys(u)p(u)du; (6)
in which dsys is estimated from equation (5), where d is a solution of equation
(3). Note that any possible correlation structure across shocks can be incorpo-
rated in p(u).
In the case of multiple equilibria, the systemic default probability cannot
be estimated directly from equation (6), as dsys(u) can take several values.
However, for a given shock, multiple equilibria can be analyzed according to
di¤erent scenarios related to di¤erent values of qj dened in equation (2).
Di¤erent states of nature are related to each of the project investments, zj ,
and the sovereigns, cj . In good (or normal) times, banks and sovereigns will
12
achieve standard returns z+j and c
+
j , respectively; in a poor outcome period
they are subject to a haircut, receiving z j and c
 
j . In this case, there are four
separate potential scenarios that the entity network may face at t = 1 to meet
its liabilities.
Good times: Investments achieve payo¤ z+j , and there are no haircuts in
sovereign debt markets, which is equivalent to the good case in Acemoglu et
al (2015). Bank networks should function normally - all sources of income are
available to meet liabilities.
c+j + z
+
j +
X
i 6=j
xj;i > vj + yj :
Stress: Investments do not perform, providing payo¤ z j , and there is poor
performance in the sovereign debt market that necessitates haircuts, which pro-
vides a sovereign with negative return c j . An entitys incoming counterparty
payments need to exceed outside obligations owing due to the investment, the
entitys own outgoing counterparty requirements, investment losses and the hair-
cut.
X
i 6=j
xj;i > vj + yj   c j   z j :
Poor investment: Investments do not perform, and a bank receives pay-
o¤ z j . However, sovereign debt markets perform normally with no haircuts
required, which yields c+j . Bank bond holdings and incoming counterparty pay-
ments need to exceed outside obligations owed, the banks own owed counter-
party requirements and the loss due to the poor investment outcome. This is
equivalent to the bad case in Acemoglu et al (2015).
c+j +
X
i 6=j
xj;i > vj + yj   z j :
Poor government: Investments perform well and provide payo¤ z+j . How-
ever, there is poor performance in the sovereign debt market entailing negative
returns, c j . An entitys income from successful investments and incoming coun-
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terparty payments needs to exceed outside obligations due to the investment,
the entitys own outgoing counterparty requirements and the haircut.
z+j +
X
i 6=j
xj;i > vj + yj   c j :
These scenarios permit the estimation of the systemic default probability in
the case of multiple equilibria. Consider the set 
  fIi[ Ig [ Isg of all possible
solutions of equation (3) for a given shock u, in which Ii is a set of equilibria in
the poor investment case, Ig is a similar set for the poor government case, and
Is is assigned to the stress scenario. Moreover, for set 
, the best-case equi-
librium can be dened as dsys(u) = infk2
d
sys
k (u), while the worst equilibrium
is dsys(u) = supk2
d
sys
k (u). These denitions select the best (worst) solutions
according to smallest (largest) number of defaults in the entity network. The
systemic default probability in the worst and best scenarios, respectivly, can be
dened as
P sys =
Z
dsys(u)p(u)du: (7)
P sys =
Z
dsys(u)p(u)du: (8)
Note that if maximal and minimal values P sys and P sys are received for indices
k1, k2 2 Ii, systemic default is caused by poor investments from banks. If k1, k2
2 Ig, systemic default is related to unsuccessful governmental policy10 . When
k1 2 Ii [ Is and k2 2 Ig [ Is mixed strategies from sovereigns and institutions
are required to minimize systemic default probability in the network.
Given the systemic default probabilities dened for di¤erent scenarios, the
risk on the systemic default probabilities can be dened as
RISK = P sys   P sys: (9)
The risk measure, RISK, dened in equation (9), denes the uncertainty of
systemic default in the presence of multiple equilibria. The level of RISK
depends on the network structure, bank returns, zj , and sovereigns, c

j .
10Acharya et al. (2014a) investigated how a government implementing a bailout triggers
credit spreads and found a positive relationship between the level of government debt and
credit risks.
14
Denition 6 A pair of equilibria d = fdsys(u); dsys(u)g is e¢ cient if and only
if RISK(d) is the lower bound across all possible equilibria dsys(u).
RISK depends on network topology, meaning that is can be used to identify
e¢ cient equilibria (see Denition 6). In the optimistic scenario, when all entities
can meet their liabilities and there are no defaults, there exists a trivial solution
of system (3) and RISK = 0.
Alternatively, the e¢ cient equilibrium state minimizes all creditorsaggre-
gate loss. Given a realization of shocks uj , the losses of creditors caused by a
default of entity j are equal to total liabilities, lj . The expected loss su¤ered by
the network as a result of entity j defaulting, ELj , is computed by aggregating
the loss over the range of shocks in the case in which entity j defaults. Total
expected systemic losses are
ELsys =
Z X
j
ljdj(u)p(u)du: (10)
Taking into account that several values of expected loss can exist in the case
of multiple equilibria, we may analyze di¤erent scenarios. Hence, the Risk of
Expected Loss (REL) can be dened as the di¤erence between the highest and
lowest expected losses:
REL = ELsys   ELsys: (11)
E¢ cient equilibria are identied by minimizing REL for a given probability
distribution of shocks, p(u).
The proposed framework makes evident how combinations of events in pri-
vate investment and sovereign debt markets may place additional stress on bank-
ing networks. There may be less heterogeneity in sovereign debt market options
available to the banks than in investments. That is, although the failure of a
relatively small investment opportunity can cascade and cause nancial stress
in the Acemoglu et al (2015) model, there are in practice fewer sovereign bond
investment opportunities available for banks. Thus, a haircut in the sovereign
debt market is likely to cause a simultaneous common shock to a number of enti-
ties, providing a further means of amplifying a crisis via the network. Moreover,
15
the stochastic shock and its variance are important quantities that impact both
sovereign and bank returns and may cause cascades of defaults in the network.
This motivates the development of the novel econometric framework presented
in Section 4.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
Modeling the interconnections between nancial institutions is hampered by
data availability. On the one hand, many of the theoretical frameworks are
expressed in terms of inter-entity ows. However, these data are exceedingly
di¢ cult to obtain, particularly outside the o¢ cial family; a good example is
the UK interbank network in Giraitis et al (2016), who use data available to
the Bank of England. On the other hand, there is a strand of literature that
takes advantage of market-based data as proxies to develop an understanding
of the interconnectedness of networks, as in, for example, Billio et al (2012)
and Merton et al (2013). A recent work by van de Leur and Lucas (2016) nds
that these interconnectedness networks based on market data produce valuable
information that is not o¤ered by alternative approaches. The work in this
paper draws on the market-based data tradition in this literature.
Five-year CDSs are the most commonly issued and traded asset in this
class and are the most liquid (Duca and Peltonen 2013, Pan & Singleton 2008,
Kalbaska and Gatkowsi 2012); data on these contracts were extracted from
Markit over the period from January 1, 2003, to November 21, 2013. Over the
full period, there are 2842 end-of-day CDS spread prices for each sovereign and
institution. The combined dataset contains 40 individual sovereigns and 67 in-
stitutions, for a total of 107 nodes used in the analysis, as listed in Tables 1 and
2.
The sample is divided into three separate phases; Phase 1 represents the non-
crisis period from January 1, 2003, to September 14, 2008. This is typical of
dating conventions used in literature to separate the pre-crisis and crisis periods;
see the review of dates extant in the literature in Dungey et al (2015). Phase 2
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represents the period from September 15, 2008, to March 31, 2010, consistent
with the global nancial crisis (GFC) and period following. The end of March
2010 represents the period prior to which the Greek debt crisis became critical
in April 2010. Phase 3, from April 1, 2010, to November 21, 2013, represents
the period of the Greek and European sovereign debt crises.
The rst panel of Table 3 shows summary statistics for Phase 1. Phase 1
is the longest of the three exogenously chosen time periods, containing 1488
observations per entity. Latin America displays a higher mean spread during
Phase 1, while nancial institutions and insurance companies exhibit relatively
higher kurtosis than other groups.
The GFC period, Phase 2, is the shortest of the sub-sample phases, with 403
observations per entity. There is an increase in spread means for most groups of
institutions and sovereigns, reecting the perceived increase in risk during this
turbulent period in international debt markets. The nancial institution group
has the largest mean, standard deviation and kurtosis during Phase 2.
The third phase, associated with the Greek debt crisis and subsequent Euro-
pean debt crisis, involves a small decline in spread means; however the Eurozone
groups mean spreads increase from Phase 2, potentially due to the transforma-
tion of the Greek debt crisis into the European debt crises during the third
phase. Insurance companies and Latin American sovereigns exhibit high levels
of kurtosis compared with other groups.
CDS spreads were found to be non-stationary, I(1), with a maximum of
one unit root according to KPSS and ADF tests. Moreover, the presence of
heteroskedasticity in daily spreads was conrmed by applying Breusch-Pagan
and White tests.
4 Econometric Framework and Hypotheses
4.1 Establishing network edges via Granger causality
Banks and sovereign debt issuers form network nodes linked by edges. The use
of Granger causality tests on CDS spreads to establish edges between nodes has
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a number of advantages in this framework. It is directly comparable to existing
empirical networks of Billio et al (2012) and Merton et al (2013). It establishes
directional edges, allowing for an examination of the causation from sovereign
debt to banking markets. Granger causality established edges map clearly to the
existing empirical frameworks for measuring and testing contagion during nan-
cial crises via the formation and breaking of linkages (the overarching framework
for this is provided in Dungey et al., 2005).
To take into consideration the common stochastic trend(s) between the I(1)
CDS series, a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is used:
Yt = 
0
Yt 1 +
k 1X
j=1
 jYt j + "t; (12)
where Yt = [Y1;t,..., Yn;t]0, Yt j = Yt j Yt j 1 and ; ;  are the parameters
of the model11 . The rank of the matrix  = 
0
is estimated applying Johansen
test and imposing the triangular restrictions of Phillips (1991). The parameters
of model (12) are obtained by applying OLS.
CDS spread data used to motivate the Granger causality testing e¤ectively
represent a premium for insurance against the default of a third party. CDS
spread prices reect a perceived risk of default; favorable news decreases the
value of the CDS spread, while unfavorable news increases the value. Signi-
cant Granger causality from entity i to entity s indicates that Yi has at least
one signicant lag predicting the value of Ys. Thus, perceived risk of entity i
defaulting predicts the perceived risk of default of entity s. The edges of the
network constructed from these Granger causality links represent predictors of
each nodes perceived risk of default.
Once a VECM in (12) is estimated12 , it can be represented as a VAR
Yt =
kX
j=1
jYt j + "t; (13)
with cross-equation restrictions 1 = 
0
+  1 + In, and j =  j    j 1,
j = 2; 3; :::; p. Granger causality between CDS spreads Yi and Ys can be assessed
11A constant term is suppressed for simplicity.
12The VECM is estimated using three lags, based on the AIC.
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using the Wald test
WT = [e  vec(b)]0 [e(bV 
 (Y 0Y ) 1)e0 ] 1[e  vec(b)]; (14)
in which Y is the matrix of independent variables from (13), vec(b) denotes the
row vectorized coe¢ cients of b = [1; :::;k], bV = T 1PTt=1 "^t"^0t and e is the
k  2(2k + 1) selection matrix
e =
2666664
0 1 0 0 : : : 0 0 : : : 0 0
0 0 0 1 : : : 0 0 : : : 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 : : : 1 0 : : : 0 0
3777775 :
Each row of e selects one of the coe¢ cients to set to zero under the non-causal
hypothesis Yi ! Ys.
The empirical contagion literature typically focuses on changes in the struc-
ture of short-term relationships across two periods. Consider, for example, the
rst-period interaction matrix estimated for a non-crisis period, denoted nc1 ,
and a crisis period, denoted cr1 , as follows:
nc1 =

ncii;1 
nc
is;1
ncsi;1 
nc
ss;1

;
cr1 =

crii;1 
cr
is;1
crsi;1 
cr
ss;1

:
Tests for changes in the network nance literature (and related tests for conta-
gion) can be characterized as tests of whether ncis;k = 
cr
is;k and 
nc
si;k = 
cr
si;k for
all k.
In this paper, the focus is on the formation of new links:
new link from Yi to Ys H0 : 
j 1
si;k = 0;
j
si;k 6= 0 (15)
new link from Ys to Yi H0 : 
j 1
is;k = 0;
j
is;k 6= 0 (16)
and the breaking of existing links
broken link from Yi to Ys H0 : 
j 1
si;k 6= 0;jsi;k = 0 (17)
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broken link from Ys to Yi H0 : 
j 1
is;k 6= 0;jis;k = 0 (18)
where index j is assigned to a phase; non-crisis, GFC or European sovereign
debt crisis.
The results of the Wald test indicating Granger causality are recorded as
binary entries in matrix A as
A = [ais];
where
ais =

0; if Yi does not Granger cause Ys
1; if Yi Granger causes Ys
Matrix A is used to construct the directional edges between sovereigns and
banks.
4.2 Network connectedness
Once linkages between institutions and sovereigns, represented by matrix A are
established, the strength of these linkages can be quantied by assigning weights
W = [wij ] to network edges13 . Using the VAR from equation (13) as an ap-
proximating model, weights wij can be obtained from variance decompositions,
as proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). Suppose that js contribution to
entity is H-step-ahead generalized forecast error variance, gij(H), is
gij(H) =
V  1jj
PH 1
h=0 (e
0
iBhV ej)
2PH 1
h=0 (e
0
iBhV B
0
hej)
; H = 1; 2; 3; :::;
in which V is the variance-covariance matrix for the error vector "t, Vjj is the
standard deviation of error term j, and ei is the selection vector with one as the
ith element and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient matrices, Bi, obey the recursion
Bi = 1Bi 1 +2Bi 2 + :::+kBi k, with B0 being an n n identity matrix
and Bi = 0 for i < 0. Note that the generalized variance decomposition allows
for correlated shocks and does not depend on the ordering of the variables.
13 In this case, the network is dened as a weighted directed graph. A weighted nancial
network is also used by Demirer, Diebold, Liu and Yilmaz (2015) and Glasserman and Young
(2015) to model connectedness between nancial institutions.
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In the original generalized framework of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996)
and Pesaran and Shin (1998), variance shares do not necessarily sum to 1, that is,Pn
j=1 
g
ij(H) 6= 1. Hence, each entry of the generalized variance decomposition
matrix is normalized by the row sum as
wij =
gij(H)Pn
j=1 
g
ij(H)
:
Now, by construction,
Pn
j=1 wij = 1 and
Pn
i;j=1 wij = n.
Given the estimates of matrix A and weighting matrix W 14 , the structure
of the weighted network can be characterized by matrix
eA = AW;
where  is the Hadamard product. Elements of adjacency matrix eA capture
the connectedness between institutions and sovereigns conditional on signicant
casual linkages between them15 . The network dened by adjacency matrix eA
shows the predictors of the risk of default subject to a shock captured by matrix
W . Using the entries of matrix eA, system-wide completeness is measured as
C =
Pn
i;j=1
i6=j
~aijPn
i;j=1
i6=j
wij
: (19)
This measure is used in the following sections to analyze the system-wide con-
nectedness between the nancial institutions and sovereigns16 . The proposed
econometric framework permits us to formalize the following empirical hypothe-
ses.
Hypothesis 1 The strength of links between nodes changes during periods of
stress. This hypothesis relates to the test of whether new links form or links are
removed due to the forces of contagion described in equations (12) to (15).
14Matrix W is not necessarily symmetric, in contrast to the partial correlation network of
Anufriev and Panchenko (2015), which is symmetric by construction.
15This approach extends the spillover index of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). While the
spillover index contains all elements of a variance decomposition matrix, here, the elements
that are not linked causally are equal to zero. The importance of disentangling the network
strength from the network structure is also highlighted by Scida (2015) in a di¤erent context.
16The completeness measure can be computed for sub-networks (e.g., the completeness of
a specic geographical region) in the same way by summing up the specic elements aij and
wij .
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Hypothesis 2 The number of links changes during a period of stress. This test
is compatible with the results in papers such as Billio et al (2012), who observe
that networks increase in density during stressful periods.
Hypothesis 3 The completeness of the weighted network increases during stress-
ful periods. This hypothesis will distinguish the results of the role of changes in
both the number and strength of linkages to determine whether networks are in
fact more intertwined during periods of stress.
Formally, we use results from the Granger causality tests in each sub-period
between each of the nodes to assess whether the strength of links between nodes
has changed. Given the estimates of matrices A and eA, hypotheses 1 and 2 can
be tested formally by applying the statistical test of Mantel (1967). The null
hypothesis that networks in two di¤erent phases are identical is tested using the
following statistic
eZ = nX
i;k=1
i6=k
~ajik~a
j 1
ik for Hypothesis 1; (20)
Z =
nX
i;k=1
i6=k
ajika
j 1
ik for Hypothesis 2; (21)
in which index j > 1; 2; 3 is assigned to designate the phases. The null distrib-
ution of Z or eZ is obtained by a nite population approach outlined by Mantel
(1967).
5 Results
To illustrate the degree of connectivity in the nancial network, Figure 1 repre-
sents the network of signicant Granger causality links between pairs of nancial
institutions in Phase 1. This network is extremely dense, making it di¢ cult to
derive any meaningful analysis of these results other than conrming the high
degree of connectivity in these markets. (Note these networks include the US
- to counter the possibility that a common market factor is driving our result
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we conducted the same analysis using US spreads as a control variable in the
Granger causality tests, with no discernible di¤erence. Consequently, we analyze
the specication including the US as a node to provide a comparable analysis
for all geographic sources of connectivity.) The high level of connectedness is
consistent with the discovery of a major common global factor in CDS spreads
in Longsta¤ et al (2011) and Eichengreen et al (2012). Due to the di¢ culty of
analyzing highly interconnected nodes, we do not present the combined network
of nancial institutions and sovereigns. In both cases, the degree of connectivity
is relatively high - the potential number of links is 67!/65!(=4355) links in the
nancial sector network, and 107!/105!(=11342) in the combined network.
We rst consider the results for the nancial network then those for the
combined nancial and sovereign network. For brevity, we record rst that in
each case, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are accepted by the empirical tests at standard
signicance levels - there is no evidence the networks are unchanged between
di¤erent phases of the sample.
5.1 Financial Institutions network
To aid analytical tractability, we condense the network shown in Figure 1 to ve
nodes. The 67 nancial institutions in our sample are grouped into institutional
types: banks, insurance companies, investment banks, real estate rms and
other nancial institutions. The constituents of these groups are shown in Table
1. The dispersion of these institutions by country is not conducive to undertaking
a geographic-institutional breakdown; as we are considering institutions involved
in the CDS market we make the relatively safe assumption these institutions are
globally active investors.17 Institutions may invest in almost any sovereign debt
market and be involved in cross-border counterparty arrangements and have
sophisticated currency hedging mechanisms in place. A potential limitation of
our approach is home bias or incomplete currency hedging distorting the results.
17An analysis of the changing connections between nancial institutions in Europe and the
US using equity market data may be found in Diebold and Yilmaz (2016) and for global banks
in Demirer et al (2015). Moreover, a number of papers consider the detailed relationships for
CDSs within these regions. For example, see Fabozzi et al (2016) for the Eurozone.
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Figure 2 presents the same information as Figure 1 using the institutional
types as nodes, displaying the same high degree of completeness. The width and
shade of the edges indicate the strength of links between two nodes, representing
the proportion of signicant linkages among potential linkages, as explained in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 2 illustrates the strength of the links involving
banks, nancial institutions and insurance companies, while links to real estate
and investment rms are less strong. Arrows on the ends of edges provide
evidence on direction of transmission - the results suggest bidirectional linkages.
Table 4 documents that 2795 of the 4355 potential links exist in Phase 1,
decreasing to 2583 in Phase 2, conrming Hypothesis 2. Between Phase 1 and
Phase 2, the net reduction in links is due to the loss of 1118 links, overwhelming
the formation of 906 slightly stronger links (the average strength of the new
links is 0.0142 compared with that of the removed links of 0.0127). Thus,
between Phases 1 and 2, the completeness of the weighted network of nancial
institutions falls from 71.41% to 64.21%, primarily through a reduced number
of links. (See also Eichengreen et al (2012), who nd that spillovers from US
to European banks decrease during the GFC period.) The further removal
of 1718 (stronger) links and formation of 579 (weaker) links between Phase 2
and Phase 3 means that the net loss of 1139 links results in weighted network
completeness falling to 36.15%, again primarily due to a decreased number of
links. Overall the Phase 3 network has 1351 fewer links than Phase 1, and
the average strength of links has increased. This important nding conrms the
fragility of the nancial sector during the GFC; see also Alter and Shuler (2012).
Another important conclusion is that once both the existence and strength of
linkages are taken into account, the completeness of the nancial network is
lower in Phase 2 compared with Phase 1, which di¤ers from the ndings of
Diebold and Yilmaz (2016), and lower in Phase 3, which is consistent with
Caporin et al (2014).
Figure 3 illustrates the location and strength of newly formed and removed
linkages for each phase. The reduction in links is distributed relatively evenly
across nancial institutions in Phase 1 and Phase 2 (Figure 3 a), reecting the
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general market conditions, rather than a specic institutional type common to
the global sample. The removal of links between banks and insurance companies
is also indirectly observable through an investment channel by unravelling the
strong direct connections from banks to investment institutions and from in-
vestments to insurance. This pattern is part of the complex debate surrounding
whether insurers were causal in generating the systemic risk of this period; see
Biggs and Richardson (2014).
Between Phase 2 and Phase 3, there is evidence of disconnection between
investment rms and real estate companies. Banks and nancial institutions
are the focus of a substantial number of disconnections during the crisis, and
this may reect new international risk assessments and domestic regulatory
environments whereby nancial companies are recognized as contributing to
systemic risk. However, the removed links from nancial companies to insurers
highlight the further propagation of systemic risks. Insurers favor self-regulation
and insurance as a recipient of shocks from banks; see Cummins and Weiss
(2014), which constrasts with the view of the Financial Stability Board, and
Acharya et al (2014b), who report that insurers may propagate systemic risk.
As a proportion of total links, there are relatively few new links forming
during Phase 2 (Figure 3c). As institutions attempt to manage their portfo-
lios, and risk appetite generally decreases, the nancial system becomes less
interconnected. Regulators around the globe have more carefully monitored -
nancial institutions since 2008, and formed new bodies to address segments of
the nancial sector, which may have been a contributing factor.
5.2 Combined nancial institutions and sovereign debt
network
The combined nancial institutions and sovereign network has potentially 107!/105!
(=11342) links. The number of links in Phase 1 is 5886, increasing to 8862 in
Phase 2 and falling to 4184 in Phase 3; see Table 4. The intertwining of these
two sectors is relatively incomplete in the pre-crisis period (at 62.61%) but rises
substantially during the rst crisis sample. In this manner, the Phase 1 network
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is robust according to the denitions of Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Acemoglu
et al (2015). The crisis periods also reect the increases in linkages found in
Billio et al (2012) and Merton et al (2013). Network link changes seem relatively
large but must be seen in the context of total number of links; in total 2567
(22.85% of all possible links) were unchanged in the unweighted network during
the sample period, 1647 (14.66%) links remained present and intact, and 920
(8.19%) links did not exist at any point in the sample. However, between Phase
1 and Phase 2, the network lost 1422 and gained 4198 links, a net gain of 2776.
The average strength of the formed links in the weighted network was 0.0088,
weaker than that of the lost links of 0.0092. That is, the increased completeness
between Phases 1 and 2 is due to the formation of more weaker links in the
presence of declining strong links. In the transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3, a
further 5479 links, of average strength 0.0091, were lost and 1001 formed, of av-
erage strength 0.0102. The net loss of 4478 links were of lower average strength
than those gained, such that overall the number of links fell, contributing to the
decline in weighted network completeness.
Not only do the proportions of links change between phases, supporting Hy-
pothesis 2, but the taxonomy of these changes is highly revealing. Categorizing
nodes into geographic sovereign debt markets and nancial institution types, as
in the previous sub-section, Figure 4 provides the schematic for links that are
broken and formed from Phases 1 to 2, and from Phases 2 to 3.
The results in Figure 4(a) show that the CDS premia for insurance com-
panies became disconnected from North American sovereign debt CDS premia
during the rst crisis phase. There is a concentration of lost connections be-
tween the North American and Euro sovereign nodes and with investment sector
links. The Eurozones disconnection from Europe and Asia is less evident in the
link changes. However, there is some evidence of disconnection between bank
CDS premia and sovereign debt, perhaps speaking to the intimate connection
that US sovereign debt has with bank balance sheets, the US Federal Reserves
liquidity provisions, and feedback e¤ects between sovereigns and banks posited
in Acharya et al (2014a).
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Relatively more links are formed between Phase 1 and Phase 2, as shown
in Figure 4(c). Most pronounced are the new links between North American,
African, Asian and Latin American sovereign bond markets, suggesting an in-
creasing importance of developing markets in global risk determination during
this phase. There are also considerable increases in investment rm linkages
with European and North American sovereign markets.
During Phase 3, the links previously established between North American,
African, Asian and Latin American sovereigns are largely undone; see Figure
4(b). There is less evidence of a retraction of links with nancial sector nodes,
although the reduction of linkages with nacial rms is relatively strong. Newly
formed links in this phase, as shown in Figure 4(d), relate to North America,
reecting new inuences on investments and Eurozone from North American
entities; this may reect increasing market involvement by non-European insti-
tutions, including Goldman Sachs and Metlife. Further inuences on new con-
nections may include asset write-downs, increased premia, regulator scrutiny of
sovereign debt exposure and feedback e¤ects between sovereign debt markets
and banks (and, by extension, the nancial sector).
The combined network is characterized by highest completeness during crisis
Phase 2, originating from nancial institutions. Moreover, the net number of
new links is positive for Phase 2 and negative for Phase 3, consistent with results
reported by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) for the global equity market; they show
that system-wide connectedness is signicantly higher during the GFC. The
di¤erence between our work and existing network papers based on Granger
causality is the use of weighted networks, revealing that although the number
of unweighted links may increase during a crisis, when the links are weighted
by their relative strength, the completeness of the network may not decline by
as much as in an unweighted system (and in some cases, the weights may be
su¢ cient to induce an increase in network completeness).18
18Recent work by Pesaran et al (2016) shows how a network can be characterized by i,
the estimated degree of pervasiveness, based on the weighted column sums of the adjacency
matrix (normalized by row). The most dominant node in the network has the largest value
of i; subject to the caveat that i > 0:5 for the existence of a valid network e¤ect. The
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5.3 Identifying the networks in di¤erent scenarios
In the previous discussion, the sensitivity of sovereigns and banks to defaults
was found to be a key characteristic for identifying the structure of the network.
Following Denition 5, the sensitivity of entities to default denes the expected
number of defaults in the network, which in turn can be used to uncover the
network structure.
Clearly, the sensitivity of a counterparty to default indicator scdj;i from
equation (4) is closely related to an impulse response function. If the direction
of shock uj is positively correlated with the number of defaults (i.e., a large neg-
ative shock increases the probability of an entity to be insolvent), measured by
vector uj , impulse responses can be used as empirical measures of scdj;i. In this
case, the expected number of defaults can be estimated from signicant Granger
causality linkages and the respective variance decompositions, as discussed in
Section 4.
Denition 7 A network G1 is more fragile than G2 if for each entity i, the
expected number of defaults introduced in Denition 5 is higher under G1 than
under G2.
As follows from Denition 719 , the fragility of the network can be assessed
based on the expected number of defaults, which is in turn dened by signicant
Granger causality linkages and the respective variance decompositions. Given
an external shock uj , the expected number of defaults can be estimated under
the di¤erent scenarios related to di¤erent values of qj (see Section 2).
To investigate the fragility of the network in the three phases, probabilities of
the di¤erent scenarios posited in our theoretical framework (Good times, Stress,
Poor investment, Poor government) are estimated. We use estimates from equa-
tion (13) for each phase to generate recursively one-step ahead forecasts. The
application of this framework to our network provides evidence of weakly dominant banking
and insurance sectors in the rst phase (bank;1 = 0:67; insurance;1 = 0:59) and weakly
dominant banking in the following two phases (bank;2 = 0:56; bank;3 = 0:74): None of the
sovereign nodes become dominant in any phase, although the value of i for European and
Euro located sovereigns approaches 0:5 in Phase 3. Consequently, the results of this approach
are aligned with the results presented in the paper.
19This denition is similar to Zhou (2016).
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predicted values of the CDS spreads are used to estimate the probabilities of
di¤erent scenarios. In particular, in each phase, probabilities Pr+ = m+=m and
Pr  = m =m, where m+=  is a number of predicted values for a higher/lower
than an average predicted CDS spread, can be interpreted as probabilities of
high and low default risks, respectively. These probabilities can be used in each
phase to obtain an aggregated shock conditional on a specic scenario:
Good times: uj = Pr+(S)  uj(S) + Pr+(F )  uj(F );
Stress : uj = Pr (S)  uj(S) + Pr (F )  uj(F );
Poor investment: uj = Pr+(S)  uj(S) + Pr (F )  uj(F );
Poor government: uj = Pr (S)  uj(S) + Pr+(F )  uj(F ):
where S is assigned to sovereigns and F to nancial institutions. These aggre-
gated shocks are used to obtain weights, wij , of variance decompositions that
allow us to identify the structure of the combined network.
The expected number of defaults for the combined network conditional on
the size of the aggregated shock, u, are presented in Figure 5 for each of the
scenarios. Figures 5(a) to (c) show the impact of scenarios based on Good times,
Stress, Poor investment, and Poor government shocks of increasing magnitude
(up to 3 standard deviations) across the horizontal axis. Although stress sce-
narios always produce the largest number of expected defaults and good times
the lowest, the degree of expected defaults varies considerably across the phases.
In Phase 1, good times result in a probability of fewer than 5 defaults, rising
to almost 50 in Phase 2 and returning to approximately 5 in Phase 3. However
stress conditions see expected defaults go from over 25 in Phase 1 to more than
100 in Phase 2, before reducing to a smaller number of fewer than 10 in Phase 3.
The third phase represents a rebound to a lower default probability than Phase
1 in stress conditions  perhaps representing the loss of already non-resilient
entites.
A further feature is that during Phase 1, shocks due to poor investment
outcomes are more likely to result in default than those due to poor government.
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Both of these increase dramatically to approximately 80 defaults in Phase 2
in either case. By Phase 3, we have a slightly higher probability of default
outcomes anticipated for the entities in the face of poor government shocks
than for poor investment shocks. Whether this is a pattern, emerging in the
aftermath of other major crises because of post-crisis risk reassessment, is a
topic worthy of further investigation. It implies that recent experience with
private investment sector shocks may reduce the likelihood of future large private
investment shocks generating large numbers of defaults. These results shed light
on debate in the literature over whether bank or sovereign default precedes the
other in an orderly manner - the results of this work suggest that it is the
intertwining of these markets that provides protection against nancial fragility.
This supports the vital importance of adopting a combined approach to systemic
risk as, particularly during periods of stress.
The empirical work in this paper provides strong evidence of the changing
strength of linkages between nodes in the network of nancial institutions and
sovereigns during periods of stress, consistent with the existence of contagion,
as argued in Hypothesis 1. The number of links between nodes changes from
between Phases 1 and 2, increasing the density of the unweighted combined net-
work, which is consistent with ndings in the existing literature and supports
Hypothesis 2. The completeness of the weighted nancial network decreases
between Phases 1 and 2 but declines dramatically in Phase 3. Our evidence
suggests that in these markets completeness was reduced for all networks be-
tween Phase 1 and 3. The changing completeness of the combined network
in the di¤erent phases and under di¤erent scenarios represents changes in the
structure and combination of what Acemoglu et al (2015) classify as a -convex
combination of networks. Overall, less diversied patterns of linkages are more
fragile during crisis times but could be more robust when normal times prevail.
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6 Conclusion
This paper investigates international connections between nancial institutions
and sovereign debt markets with both a theoretical framework and an empiri-
cally tractable implementation. We extend the model of Acemoglu et al (2015),
which shows how nancial institutions facing shocks generated from real econ-
omy investments may demonstrate a robust-but-fragile network subject to in-
creased risk of default when faced with either a su¢ ciently large shock (or con-
temporaneous small shocks). Our innovation is to extend uncertainty a¤ecting
returns to sovereign bond markets as the alternative investment option to the
risk modelled for the real economy investments. By including potential haircuts
on sovereign debt investment, we address the debate on the importance of links
between nancial institutions and sovereign debt under crisis conditions.
The results reinforce the robust-but-fragile nature of networks of nan-
cial institutions facing real economy shocks and emphasize that sovereign debt
market haircuts may additionally cause simultaneous shocks to a number of in-
stitutions, providing a means of amplifying uncertainty via the network. This
uncertainty implies di¤erent scenarios for network changes: Good times, in which
both returns in the real economy are good and there are no sovereign defaults in
which case the network is relatively robust; Poor investment, in which returns
in the real economy are poor but there are no sovereign defaults, consistent
with potential stress under the robust-but-fragileanalysis of Acemoglu et al
(2015); Poor government, in which returns in the real economy are good but
poor government policy leads to sovereign bond haircuts, these may lead to -
nancial system fragility; and Stress conditions, in whcih both poor returns in
the real eocnomy and sovereign haircuts place stress on the nancial network.
These scenarios permit identication of the sources of changes to the networks
systemic default probability and estimate the expected number of defaults in
the combined network. Our ndings speak strongly in favor of the necessity
of mixed strategies by sovereigns and nancial institutions to minimize the ex-
pected number of defaults in the network during the GFC and European crisis.
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The paper specically examines the transition of a combined network of sov-
ereigns and nancial institution and one of nancial institutions during the pe-
riod 2003-2014 through three phases. In the transition between Phase 1 (repre-
senting non-crisis conditions) and Phase 2 (which corresponds to the GFC), the
network shows evidence of changing linkages between nodes - both the removal
of existing links and the formation of new links, consistent with the contagion
literature. Between Phases 1 and 2, the net number of links in the combined
network increases; the sheer growth in the number of linkages is enough to
increase weighted network completeness, consistent with the greater density of
links observed in much of the existing work on nancial networks during periods
of crisis. Between Phases 2 and 3, corresponding to the European sovereign debt
crisis, the number of links declines signicantly, demonstrating recovery from the
GFC. The disentangling of the strength and existence of linkages between nodes
reveals that the completeness of the weighted network may decrease, consistent
with the existence of contagion and increasing numbers of links. It provides
conrmatory evidence of the robust-but-fragile nature of the network during
periods of crisis.
Examining changes in the networks by geographical region and type of insti-
tution reveals that during the transition from the pre-crisis Phase 1 to Phase 2
of the GFC, there is a signicant formation of links, which mainly centers on the
Eurozone, North and Latin America and investment companies. This follows
expectations, as the GFC was closely linked to the collapse of the United States
subprime mortgage market. In the transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3, the
Greek/European debt crisis, most link changes are centered on North America
and the Eurozone. A large number of links are formed from North America to
investment companies and to the Eurozone.
The next step in this agenda is to test for evidence of key links between
sovereigns and nancial institutions in terms of -dependency, Acemoglu et al
(2013), which identies whether there are critical sets of links that inuence the
nancial fragility of the system.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 .
This trivially follows from the denition of ~qj :( 1;+1)! [ 1; 1].
Proof of Proposition 2. Condition (a)
Suppose that the network G does not contain any cycles. In this case the
set of all nodes is
N = fNl [Nbg; (22)
? = fNl \Nbg; (23)
where Nb contains entities that only borrow money from their counterparties,
and Nl is a set of lenders. If entities from Nb do not lend to anyone, for any
realization of shock u, there exists a unique threshold value, ~qj , for all j 2 Nb.
Therefore, the set Nl contains all creditors of entities from set Nb. The default
conditions for all i 2 Nl are determined by the borrowers and for this reason are
also unique. This implies that the existence of a continuum of equilibria is only
possible when there is at least one entity that simultaneously lends and borrows
money, which contradicts (23). Hence, multiple equilibria can exist only in the
cyclical network.
Condition (b)
Assume that there exists at least one cycle Ck in the network G. It is
su¢ cient to show that for a specic realization of shock u, the network G has
at least two equilibria. Consider the sensitivity to default measure, scdk;k 1,
dened in (4). If scdk;k 1 6= 0, then there exists a non-empty interval
[ai; bi] = [min(~qk(dk 1 = 0); ~qk(dk 1 = 1));max(~qk(dk 1 = 0); ~qk(dk 1 = 1))];
which implies di¤erent values for the default conditions.
Consider two vectors of payments (x^1; :::x^k) and (x1; :::; xk), that are asso-
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ciated with the threshold values
~q1(x1 = x^1) = a1
::: =
~qk(xk = x^k) = ak
and
~q1(x1 = x1) = b1
::: =
~qk(xk = xk) = bk
In this case each of k entities are linked by mutual liabilities. However, in this
case shock ui takes values on the interval [ai; bi], which implies two equilibria,
d^ and d.
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Table 1: Financial institutions grouped by broad type.
Banks Financials Insurance
Aust & New Zld Bkg ACOM CO LTD ACE Ltd
Amern Express Co John Deere Cap Corp Aegon N.V.
Barclays Bk plc MBIA Inc. American Intl Gp Inc
BNP Paribas Natl Rural Utils Coop Allstate Corp
Cap One Finl Corp Aiful Corp Aon Corp
Citigroup Inc ORIX Corp Assicurazioni Generali
Ctrywde Home Lns Gen Elec Cap Corp CHUBB CORP
Kookmin Bk Goldman Sachs Gp Inc CNA Finl Corp
Commerzbank AG Morgan Stanley Legal & Gen Gp PLC
Deutsche Bk AG SEARS ROEBUCK MBIA Ins Corp
Hana Bank Toyota Mtr Cr Corp MetLife Inc
HSBC Bk plc Swire Pac Ltd Munich Re
ING Bk N V Old Mut plc
Korea Dev Bk Safeco Corp
Merrill Lynch & Co Mitsui Sumitomo Ins
Mizuho Corporate Bk Sompo Japan Ins Inc
Macquarie Bk Ltd HARTFORD FIN INC
Natl Aust Bk Ltd Loews Corp
Oversea Chinese Bkg
Rabobank Nederland
Royal Bk of Scotland
Resona Bk Ltd
Societe Generale
Std Chartered Bk
Sumitomo Mitsui Bkg
UBS AG
Wells Fargo & Co
Westpac Bkg Corp
Investment Real Estate
Daiwa Secs Gp EOP Oper Ltd Pship
Bombardier Hammerson PLC
Nomura Secs Hongkong Ld Co
Mitsubishi Estate Co
Simon Ppty Gp L P
Simon Ppty Gp Inc
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Table 2: Sovereigns grouped by region. Groups are
intentionally broad to minimize the total number.
Europe Asia Latin America
Bulgaria Australia Argentina
Czech Republic China Brazil
Denmark Indonesia Chile
Norway Japan Colombia
Poland Malaysia Mexico
Sweden Philippines Panama
Russia South Korea Peru
Turkey Thailand Venezuela
Ukraine Vietnam
Africa Euro Zone North America
Israel Belgium USA
Morocco Finland
South Africa France
Qatar Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
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Table 3: Summary statistics are reported for all sovereign and
nancial institution CDS spread data used in this paper.
Obs. Mean Std dev Skewness Kurtosis
Phase 1 01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008
Banks 1488 0.4253 0.6634 6.2252 73.1315
Financials 1488 0.7426 1.4386 9.2843 131.738
Insurance 1488 0.5413 1.1174 10.551 146.240
Investment 1488 1.0126 1.6023 3.5076 19.9933
Real Estate 1488 0.5737 0.5135 2.5807 11.3350
Latin America 1488 3.3274 5.0302 4.3823 24.8403
Asia 1488 1.0935 1.3470 1.4863 4.1704
Euro Zone 1488 0.0698 0.0759 2.8669 11.6775
Europe 1488 0.9062 1.5211 2.8717 13.9841
Africa 1488 0.8038 0.7205 2.5980 11.9358
North America 1488 0.0262 0.0311 2.9249 11.0294
Phase 2 15/09/2008 - 31/03/2010
Banks 403 1.6490 1.2574 2.1977 8.4938
Financials 403 12.719 32.619 6.6554 58.383
Insurance 403 3.6890 5.1029 2.4613 9.2081
Investment 403 1.9650 1.1711 1.0721 2.8133
Real Estate 403 2.6080 2.4492 1.4525 4.1223
Latin America 403 6.3541 8.8135 2.2891 7.7371
Asia 403 2.0159 1.5864 1.7696 7.0876
Euro Zone 403 0.8250 0.5597 1.5966 6.8034
Europe 403 3.4588 6.4693 3.8884 20.298
Africa 403 1.9245 0.9750 1.3394 4.5551
North America 404 0.4169 0.1834 1.1935 3.9374
Phase 3 01/04/2010 - 21/10/2013
Banks 951 1.3971 0.6334 1.6584 6.8687
Financials 951 6.3933 10.211 2.0464 5.9045
Insurance 951 1.8314 2.1538 3.7857 20.033
Investment 951 1.4738 1.0772 0.5886 2.2274
Real Estate 951 1.1053 0.4586 0.6091 2.8172
Latin America 951 3.7769 5.6733 3.1106 14.840
Asia 951 1.3284 0.7275 1.6687 6.1909
Euro Zone 951 2.5872 2.5487 1.9267 7.1373
Europe 951 1.6592 1.9220 2.2460 7.9880
Africa 951 1.4990 0.5059 0.5376 2.5000
North America 951 0.3067 0.0801 -0.2616 2.3762
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Table 4: This table contains statistics used in the analysis of network structures.
The average link strength is estimated from the connectedness of each respective network.
The number of edges was calculated using bivariate Granger causality tests
between network nodes (entities). Completeness is calculated via equation (19).
Formed Removed
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 2 2 to 3
Average strength 0.0146 0.0150 0.0153 0.0142 0.0130 0.0127 0.0148
No. of edges 2795 2583 1444 906 579 1118 1718
Completeness 0.7141 0.6421 0.3615 0.2129 0.1236 0.2483 0.4215
Combined
Average strength 0.0100 0.0092 0.0099 0.0088 0.0102 0.0092 0.0091
No. of edges 5886 8662 4184 4198 1001 1422 5479
Completeness 0.6261 0.7694 0.4127 0.3586 0.1018 0.1400 0.4847
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Figure 1: This gure displays the network of nancials in Phase 1
(01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008). Edges were calculated with bivariate
Granger causality tests between nancial institutions (nodes)
at the 5% level of signicance.
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Figure 2: This gure shows a condensed version of the Phase 1 nancial
network from Figure 1. The changes are performed by grouping
nancial institutions/nodes into industries.
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(a): Removed links Phase 1 to 2 (b): Removed links Phase 2 to 3
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(c): Formed links Phase 1 to 2 (d): Formed links Phase 2 to 3
Figure 3: This group of gures displays changes in the nancial network
between Phase 1 (01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008), Phase 2 (15/09/2008 -
31/03/2010) and Phase 3 (01/04/2010 - 21/10/2013). Changes are
calculated using matrix eA.
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(a): Removed links Phase 1 to 2 (b): Removed links Phase 2 to 3
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Figure 4: This group of gures displays the combined sovereign and nancial
network changes. Changes between Phase 1 (01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008),
Phase 2 (15/09/2008 - 31/03/2010) and Phase 3 (01/04/2010 - 21/10/2013)
are calculated from matrix eA.
48
Figure 5: This set of gures shows expected number of defaults in the combined
network for a shock size by multiples of standard deviations under the di¤erent
scenarios. The logarithm of the CDS spreads is used for calculation.
(a): Phase 1 (01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008)
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(b): Phase 2 (15/09/2008 - 31/03/2010)
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(c): Phase 3 (01/04/2010 - 21/10/2013)
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